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BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY?
THE FCC'S IMPLEMENTATION
OF NET NEUTRALITY
DAWN C. NUNZIATO*

[W]e say to the public that there is a place, the FCC,where you can
come to have allegations of network neutrality violationsheard and
acted upon. **
INTRODUCTION

Since the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
removed common carriage obligations' from Internet cable
broadband providers in 2002, free speech and open access
advocates have been lamenting the FCC's market-oriented, laissezfaire approach and have called for net neutrality regulation to
remedy the problems brought about by an unregulated market for
Internet communications. Such regulation would reimpose some of
the common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations historically
imposed on telecommunications providers and would prohibit
broadband providers from censoring, blocking, or otherwise
discriminating against any legal content or applications that users
sought to communicate via broadband pipes. In August 2008,
however, the FCC reversed its laissez-faire course and censured
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**Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13079 (2008) (memorandum opinion and
order).
1. "Common carriage obligations" refers to a regulatory framework
imposed on common carriers. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-31 (2006).
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Comcast-one of the nation's largest broadband providers-for
engaging in discriminatory network management practices. In its
Comcast2 order, the FCC condemned Comcast's practice of
engaging in the clandestine blocking of certain peer-to-peer filesharing applications and ordered it to discontinue these and other
"unreasonable" network management practices and to come clean
with the public about the ways in which it manages communications
on its network.'
Some have argued that the FCC's willingness to act in these
circumstances obviates the need for general net neutrality
regulation or for broadly-applicable rulemaking by the FCC. 4 In
this Article, I contend that, while these recent actions by the FCC
are a step in the right direction, the FCC's ad hoc, ex post
adjudication actions stand on uneasy jurisdictional footing and, in
any case, are insufficient to remedy fully the problems caused by
the FCC's removing nondiscrimination obligations from broadband
providers in the first place-most significantly, the harm to the free
flow of expression on the Internet. In Part I of this Article, I
describe the uneven history of the FCC's regulatory treatment of
Internet service providers (ISPs). In Part II, I analyze the Comcast
network management practices that were the subject of the FCC's
August 2008 order, as well as the order itself. In particular, I
scrutinize the FCC's asserted basis for claiming jurisdiction to
adjudicate such actions by broadband providers, in light of the fact
that the FCC had previously classified such providers as subject to
minimal regulatory oversight.
In Part III, I contend thatnotwithstanding the order and the FCC's apparent willingness of
late to impose checks on broadband providers' censorial and
discriminatory conduct-broadly applicable, ex ante legislative or
agency action is necessary to impose general nondiscrimination
obligations on broadband providers. Congress should enact net
neutrality legislation to prohibit broadband providers from
discriminating against legal content or applications in the form of
2. 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (memorandum opinion and order).
3. Id. at 13028.
4. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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censoring or degrading such expression, or should require the FCC
to adopt binding, generally applicable rules prohibiting such
discrimination.

I.REGULATION (AND DEREGULATION) OF INTERNET SERVICE
PROVIDERS

A. The FCC's Decisions Exempting BroadbandProvidersfrom
the Common CarriageObligations Historically Imposed on
Conduitsfor Communication
From the beginning of the mass communications era, the
United States imposed "common carrier" obligations on certain
powerful private entities engaged in providing transportation for,
and facilitating the communications of, the public to facilitate the
flow of commerce and information free of censorship or
Through the common carriage doctrine, the
discrimination.5
government, by way of legislation and the common law, imposed
nondiscrimination duties on entities providing transportation and
facilitating communication for the public, like telephone companies
and the postal service. 6 Rather than granting communications and
telecommunications providers the discretion to regulate speech
however they see fit, the common carriage doctrine requires that
such conduits not discriminate among the communications they are
charged with carrying.7 As the Internet grew to become an
increasingly popular medium of communication, the question how
8
to regulate those who facilitated Internet communications arose.
In the formative years of the Internet's development, the FCC
regulated ISPs-including narrowband and Digital Subscriber Line
(DSL) providers-as common carriers subject (inter alia) to

5. See DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND
FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 65-69 (2009).
6. Id. at 65-66.
7. Id. at 67-68.
8. Id. at 115-22.
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nondiscrimination obligations. 9 Yet in 2002, the FCC began a
process of removing such obligations from providers of broadband
Internet access.1 ° This course of removing such obligations from
broadband providers was approved by the United States Supreme
Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Services.11 Below, I outline the evolution of the FCC's
deregulation of Internet conduits for communication.
In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress granted the
FCC the authority to regulate telephone companies as common
carriers. 1
The common carriage obligations imposed on
telecommunications providers ensured that the public had a right to
communicate via telephone free from discrimination by the
telephone companies. 13 In the 1970s, as telephone companies
began offering other types of services in addition to serving as
conduits for telephone conversations, the FCC articulated a
framework to distinguish between their conduit function and the
value-added services that they offered.
In a series of three
"Computer Inquiry" decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC
established essentially the following two categories of services: (1)
basic services-those that "offer[ed] . . . transmission capacity for
the movement of information" - which were regulated as common
carriers 14 and (2) "enhanced" or value-added services-those that
"combin[ed] basic service with computer processing applications
that act on the ... subscriber's transmitted information, or provide
the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or
involve subscriber interaction with stored information"-which
were not regulated as common carriers."

9. Id. at 120-21.
10. Id. at 121-27.
11. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
12. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064
(current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2006)).
13. Id. § 202, 48 Stat. at 1070 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 202).
14. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'ns Rules & Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 (1980) [hereinafter
Computer II] (final decision).
15. Id.
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In its passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,16
Congress revised the categorization of services subject to common
carriage regulation. Under the 1996 Act, "telecommunications
services" were made subject to common carriage regulation
(replacing the category of "basic services"), while "information
services" were exempted from mandatory common carriage
regulation (replacing the exempt category of "enhanced
services"). 7 While the Act maintained significant common carrier
obligations on providers of telecommunications services, it left
information services providers subject to far less stringent
regulation. 8 Such services were merely subject to regulation under
the FCC's amorphous ancillary jurisdiction-i.e., its jurisdiction to
impose additional regulatory obligations ancillary to its jurisdiction
to regulate interstate and foreign communications. 9
A central issue in interpreting the Telecommunications Act
was how, if at all, the provision of broadband Internet access by
cable providers (and of broadband access more generally) should
be regulated.2 °
If regulated as telecommunications services,
broadband providers would be subject to common carriage
regulation, which would prohibit them from, among other things,
discriminating against any legal content or applications (and would21
also require them to allow interconnection by unaffiliated ISPs).
If regulated instead as providers of information services, broadband

16. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
17. See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2006).
18. See id. §§ 153, 201-31.

19. See id. § 154(i).
20. See generally Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband
Internet Access Over Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677 (2001) (noting that

the regulation of cable-based high-speed Internet is a difficult topic in light of
the existing regulatory framework).
21. The Act provides that common carriers must furnish service upon
reasonable request and must establish reasonable charges, practices,
classifications, and regulations regarding service. 47 U.S.C. § 201. It also
imposes obligations upon common carriers to interconnect with the facilities
and services of other carriers and end users, and sets out the terms and
conditions under which incumbent carriers must interconnect with newcomer
carriers. Id. § 251.

2009] IMPLEMENTATION OF NET NEUTRALITY

143

providers would be exempt from common carriage obligations and
would be subject only to the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction. When it
enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress did not
resolve this question and presumably vested the FCC with the
discretion to make this determination.
In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress
also set forth several broad tenets of federal Internet policy. On
one hand, the Act provides that the Internet should be allowed to
flourish in a "minimal regulatory environment, 22 characterized
• .,23 by a
"free market ... unfettered by Federal or State regulation."
On
the other hand, the Act articulates the federal Internet policy of
"maximiz[ing] user control over what information is received by
individuals ... who use the Internet., 24 A conflict arises-as it did
in the Comcast adjudication 25-when maximizing Internet users'
control over what Internet content or applications they will receive
requires regulation of ISPs.
In determining how to regulate broadband providers, the
FCC was required to decide whether to place them under the same
regulatory framework as narrowband providers. Providers of
narrowband Internet access offer connection via traditional
telephone lines and are regulated as telecommunications services
subject
to
common
carrier
regulation
under
the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.26 Over the past ten years,
however, as Internet technology has advanced, many Internet users
have migrated from the dial-up, narrowband universe to broadband
technologies, which provide vastly faster Internet access. 27 The
predominant broadband technologies used by residential Internet
users are provided via high-speed cable modems and DSL.28
Because DSL broadband Internet access is provided via telephone
22. High-Speed Access, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling
and notice of proposed rulemaking).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
24. Id. § 230(b)(3) (emphasis added).
25. Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13079 (2008) (memorandum
opinion and order).
26. See 47 U.S.C. § 153.
27. See NUNZIATO, supra note 5, at 121.
28. Id.
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lines, the provision of this service was initially regulated as a
telecommunications
service
subject
to
common
carriage/nondiscrimination regulations.2 9
The regulation of
broadband access via cable, however, proved to be a more
complicated question.
Cable broadband providers were not
providing traditional telecommunications services and traditionally
cable providers were providing their own choice of content to users
via one-way connections.3° Yet, as they upgraded their wires to
allow for two-way Internet communications, they began to provide
services that looked like traditional telecommunications conduit
services.31 If cable broadband providers essentially served as
conduits for the Internet content originated by others-in the same
way that narrowband and DSL providers did-regulatory parity
would dictate that they be subject to the same types of common
carriage/non-discrimination obligations as were dial-up and DSL
providers. But the principle of regulatory parity did not carry the
day.
B. The FCC's 2002 DeclaratoryRuling Exempting Cable
BroadbandFrom Common CarriageRegulation
In 2000, the FCC initiated a rulemaking proceeding to
determine how to apply the Telecommunications Act's
classifications to cable broadband providers. In its 2002 declaratory
ruling, "Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
over Cable and Other Facilities, 32 the FCC concluded that cable
broadband was an "information service" with "no separate offering
of telecommunications service."33

Having concluded that cable

companies do not provide telecommunications services when they
offer broadband cable Internet services, the FCC ruled that the
provision of such services was outside the scope of Title II's

29. Id. at 120.
30. Id. at 121.
31. Id.
32. 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter High-Speed Access] (declaratory
ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking).
33. Id. at 4802.
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mandatory common carriage regulatory framework.3 4 The FCC
ruled that the provision of cable broadband service does not
contain a separate telecommunications service because the
transmission of the Internet user's communications is "part and
parcel" of that information service, and is integral to its
capabilities. 35 As an information service with "no separate offering
of telecommunications service," 36 cable operators' provision of
broadband Internet access was exempt from the common carrier
regulations of Title II and was subject only to the FCC's "Title I
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign
communications.' 37 The FCC based its decision, in part, on the
policy judgment that "broadband services should exist in a minimal
regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation
in a competitive market., 38 Yet, notwithstanding its conclusion that
cable broadband was exempt from Title II common carriage
regulation, the FCC solicited comments in a companion notice of
proposed rulemaking regarding whether it should, under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction, require cable companies to provide open
access and to offer other ISPs access to their facilities on commoncarrier terms.3 9
The FCC's decision to exempt cable broadband from
common carriage obligations was challenged by non-facilities-based
ISPs that sought open access and asserted the right to interconnect
with cable providers' pipelines. 40 These ISPs sought a ruling that
cable broadband providers should be regulated as providers of
telecommunications
services subject to common carriage
41
obligations. In its 2005 Brand X decision, the Supreme Court held
that the FCC enjoyed the discretion to interpret the
Telecommunications Act, as it had done in its Declaratory Ruling,
34. Id. at 4847-48.
35.
36.
37.
967, 976
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 4823.
Id. at 4802
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
(2005).
High-Speed Access, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802.
Id. at 4839-42.
See NUNZIATO, supra note 5, at 122.
Id. at 125.
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to decline to subject cable operators' provision of broadband
Internet access-or the provision of any other type of broadband
Internet
access-to
common
carriage/nondiscrimination
obligations. 4 ' The Supreme Court also explained that the FCC
enjoyed the authority under its ancillary jurisdiction to regulate
broadband providers-even while not regulating them as common
carriers-if necessary to advance the federal government's and the
FCC's general policies in the Internet realm.4 3 Such amorphous
and unfettered ancillary jurisdiction and discretion, however, have
proved problematic, as is evident in the FCC's recent exercise of
this authority.
C. The Brand X Decision
In Brand X, the Supreme Court set into motion a course of
events that led to the FCC's recent adjudicatory actions. The Court
reviewed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the FCC's interpretation
of the
Communications
Act,
as
amended
by
the
Telecommunications Act, did not require it to revisit its earlier
holding" that cable broadband was subject to common carriage
regulation under Title II. 4 ' The Ninth Circuit held that the FCC
could not permissibly construe the Communications Act to exempt
cable broadband from Title II common carriage regulation.4 6 The
Supreme Court reversed.4 7
In a rare parting of ways between Justices Thomas, who
authored the opinion of the Court, and Scalia, who issued a
scathing dissent, Justice Thomas first explained that as a matter of
administrative law, the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to apply
Chevron deference48 to the FCC's Declaratory Ruling.4 9 Under

42. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002.
43. Id. at 976.
44. AT&T v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
45. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979-80.
46. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003),
rev'd, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
47. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003.
48. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (holding that if a statute is ambiguous and the implementing
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Chevron, a federal court is permitted to substitute its construction
of the statute for the agency's only if it concludes that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute. 50
Because the Ninth Circuit had concluded merely that its reading
was the best reading-not the only permissible reading-of the
statute, the Ninth Circuit's construction could not trump the FCC's
construction of the statute.51
The Supreme Court first held that the Telecommunications
Act was ambiguous as to whether cable broadband providers were
providers of telecommunications services.52 While cable companies
use "telecommunications" to provide consumers with Internet
service, they were not necessarily offering telecommunications
services, according to the Court. 3 Rather, the Court credited the
FCC's reasoning that whether the service included a
telecommunications offering "'turn[ed] on the nature of the
functions the end user is offered.' 5 4 Seen from the end user's
perspective, cable broadband is not a telecommunications service
because "the consumer uses the high-speed wire always in
connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by
Internet access, and because the transmission is a necessary
component of Internet access."55 According to the FCC's analysis
(credited by the Court), end users make use of the wire provided by
cable companies in order to "access the World Wide Web,
newsgroups, and so forth, rather than 'transparently' to transmit
and receive.., messages without computer processing or storage of
the message., 56
Because such communications were always
agency's construction is reasonable, a federal court must accept the agency's
construction even if it differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation).
49. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980-82.
50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.

51. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984-85.
52. Id. at 986.
53. Id. at 989.
54. Id. at 988 (emphasis omitted) (quoting High-Speed Access, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798, 4822 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed
rulemaking)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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integrated with computer processing and storage, the FCC
permissibly concluded that "cable modem service was not a 'standalone,' transparent offering of telecommunications." 57 The Court
rejected the argument that cable companies providing Internet
service necessarily also provide telecommunications service because
they provide the underlying telecommunications used to transmit
Internet services:
Cable companies in the broadband Internet
service business "offe[r]" consumers an
information service in the form of Internet
access
and
they
do
so
''via
telecommunications,"
but it does not
inexorably follow as a matter of ordinary
language that they also "offe[r]" consumers...
(telecommunications) that is an input used to
provide this service ....
The question . . . is whether the transmission

component of cable modem service is
sufficiently integrated with the finished service
to make it reasonable to describe the two as a
single, integrated offering. We think that they
are sufficiently

integrated

.

.

.

.

Such

functionally integrated components need not
be described as distinct "offerings." 58
Justice Thomas concluded that, because of ambiguities in
the statutory language, it was permissible for the FCC to determine
that the transmission component of cable modem service was
sufficiently integrated with the complete service it offered such that
it was reasonable to describe the combination as a single, integrated
offering that constituted an information service with no separate
offering of a telecommunications service.59

57. Id.
58. Id. at 989-91 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 990-91.
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Applying Chevron's second step, the Court concluded that
the FCC's construction was reasonable. 60 It rejected the argument
that the FCC's construction was unreasonable because it would
allow Internet communications providers to evade common
carriage obligations historically imposed on other conduits for
communication. 6' It also rejected the argument that the FCC's
interpretation was arbitrary and capricious because it left providers
of broadband Internet access via DSL subject to common carriage
requirements while removing such requirements from cable
broadband providers.62 The Court held that the FCC enjoyed the
discretion gradually to alter telecommunications policy so as to
eventually exempt the provision of all broadband Internet access
from common carriage requirements. 6 ' As a consolation to open
access and net neutrality advocates, however, the Court concluded
that the FCC "remains free to impose special regulatory duties on
64
[broadband providers] under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.,
Justice Scalia, dissenting, offered a harsh critique of the
FCC's interpretation and newly-proclaimed (and seemingly
unconstrained) freedom to regulate broadband providers under its
ancillary jurisdiction. 65 Scalia's critique anticipates the problems
inherent in the FCC's recent exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction in
the Comcast order. 66 According to Justice Scalia, cable broadband
providers clearly offer telecommunications services and to hold
otherwise and permit them to evade common carriage obligations
was nonsensical. 67 He rejected the interpretation advanced by the
FCC:
that
cable
broadband
providers'
bundling
of
telecommunications services with value-added services meant that

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 997.
Id.
Id. at 1000-02.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 1013-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

66. Id. See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 (2008)
(memorandum opinion and order) (holding that Comcast's "discriminatory
and arbitrary

practice

.

.

.

does not

constitute

reasonable

management," and ordering Comcast to cease such practice).
67. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1006-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

network
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they should not be classified as providers of telecommunications
services:
The relevant question is whether the individual
components in a package being offered still
possess sufficient identity to be described as
separate objects of the offer, or whether they
have been so changed by their combination
with the other components that it is no longer
reasonable to describe them in that way.
There are instances in which it is ridiculous to
deny that one part of a joint offering is being
offered merely because it is not offered on a
"stand-alone" basis. If, for example, I call up a
pizzeria and ask whether they offer delivery,
both common sense and common "usage"
would prevent them from answering: "No, we
do not offer delivery-but if you order a pizza
from us, we'll bake it for you and then bring it
to your house." The logical response to this
would be something on the order of, "so, you
do offer delivery." But our pizza-man may
continue to deny the obvious and explain,
paraphrasing the FCC and the Court: "No,
even though we bring the pizza to your house,
we are not actually 'offering' you delivery,
because the delivery that we provide to our end
users is 'part and parcel' of our pizzeria-pizzaat-home service and is 'integral to its other
capabilities."' Any reasonable customer would
conclude at that point that his interlocutor was
either crazy or following some too-clever-byhalf legal advice.
Despite the Court's mighty labors to prove
otherwise, the telecommunications component
of cable-modem service retains such ample
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independent identity that it must be regardedas
being on [sic] offer-especially when seen from
the perspective of the consumer or the end
68
user.
In other words, even though cable broadband providers provide
some information services in addition to the telecommunications
services they offer, it was irrational to conclude that there is no
separately identifiable offering of telecommunications service that
is subject to common carriage regulation.
The discretion that the FCC purported to reserve to
regulate the provision of broadband Internet services under its Title
I ancillary jurisdiction was also subjected to Justice Scalia's
trenchant criticism:
This [unfettered ancillary jurisdiction] is a
wonderful illustration of how an experienced
agency can (with some assistance from
credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into
bureaucratic discretions. The main source of
the Commission's regulatory authority over
common carriers is Title II, but the
Commission has rendered that inapplicable in
this instance by concluding that the definition
of "telecommunications service" is ambiguous
and does not (in its current view) apply to
cable-modem
service.
It
contemplates,
however, altering that (unnecessary) outcome,
not by changing the law (i.e., its construction of
the Title II definitions), but by reserving the
right to change the facts. Under its undefined
and sparingly used "ancillary" powers, the
Commission might conclude that it can order
cable
companies
to
"unbundle"
the
telecommunications component of cablemodem service. And presto, Title II will then
apply to them, because they will finally be

68. Id. at 1006-08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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"offering" telecommunications service! . .
Such M6bius-strip reasoning mocks the
principle that the statute constrains the agency
in any meaningful way.69
Within three years of the Brand X decision, the FCC
determined that it indeed enjoyed ancillary jurisdiction to regulate
a cable broadband provider.7 ° Below, I explore the actions of the
FCC and of broadband providers that led to this result, as well as
the problems arising from the FCC's exercise of this unconstrained
ancillary jurisdiction.
After the Brand X decision, the FCC removed common
carriage regulations from every other type of broadband provider,7 '
as the Court's opinion authorized it to do.72 One month after
Brand X was handed down, the FCC ruled that the provision of
broadband Internet access via DSL, like cable broadband, was also
an "information service," and therefore that telephone companies'
provision of broadband Internet access via DSL would be exempt
from common carriage requirements.7 ' The FCC subsequently
ruled that all other types of broadband are likewise exempt from
common carriage/nondiscrimination regulations. Thus, under the
Telecommunications Act, decisions about what expression to
censor and what expression to facilitate were left solely to the

69. Id. at 1013-14.
70. See Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13034-36.
71. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14858 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline
Broadband Order] (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking); see
also NUNZIATO, supra note 5, at 126 (discussing Wireline Broadband Order).
72. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002-03.
73. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 71, at 14858. For
transition purposes, Wireline Broadband Order required DSL providers to
"continue to provide existing wireline broadband Internet access transmission
offerings, on a grandfathered basis, to unaffiliated ISPs" for one year after the
date of the order's publication of September 23, 2005. Id.
74. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 71, at 14858. See Rob
Frieden, Neither Fish nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regulation of
Information Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 373 (2008).
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discretion of the companies providing broadband Internet accessfor most residential Internet users, the cable/telephone duopoly.75
D. The FCC's 2005 BroadbandPolicy Statement
When the FCC exempted DSL providers from common
carriage/non-discrimination obligations, at least one of the FCC
Commissioners was troubled by the implications of this course of
action. Commissioner Michael Copps, a long-time advocate of net
neutrality principles, managed to prevail upon his colleagues to
adopt a statement of broadband policy setting forth Internet users'
basic rights.7 6 Accordingly, shortly after the Brand X decision, on
the same day that it exempted DSL providers from common
carriage requirements, the FCC Commissioners issued a Broadband
Policy Statement (Policy Statement) setting forth four principles
regarding consumers' access to the Internet:
* consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet
content of their choice[;]
* ...
consumers are entitled to run applications and use
services of their choice, subject to the needs of law
enforcement[;]
*... consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal
devices that do not harm the network[;]

75. According to the FCC's 2006 data, about ninety-five percent of all
residential broadband is provided by the cable/telephone duopoly. See
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION,
BUREAU,

FCC, HIGH-SPEED

WIRELINE COMPETITION

SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF

31, 2006 9 tbl.3,
chart 6 (2007), available at
http://www.masstech.org/broadband/FCC07data.pdf.
76. See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13078 (2008) (Copps,
Comm'r, concurring) (memorandum opinion and order) (After the Brand X
decision gave the Supreme Court's stamp of approval of the 2002 Declaratory
Ruling, "the Commission was more interested in re-categorizing
telecommunications services as information services and eliminating many of
the social and economic responsibilities of broadband service providers. I
urged my colleagues to at least adopt an Internet Policy Statement that
contained the basic rights of Internet end-users. .. ").
DECEMBER

154
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consumers are entitled to competition among network

providers, application and service providers, and
content providers."
The legal force of these principles is unclear, and the
uncertain status of the principles further contributes to the
uncertainty surrounding the FCC's recent actions regulating
broadband providers to ensure their compliance with these
principles. On one hand, in the Policy Statement, the FCC
recognized that it has "a duty to preserve and promote the vibrant
and open character of the Internet as the telecommunications
marketplace enters the broadband age," and, in order to do so,
promised to "incorporate the above principles into its ongoing
policymaking activities., 7 1 In so doing, the FCC arguably provided
notice to broadband providers of its intent to adjudicate or enact
rules in accord with these policies. The FCC made clear that if it
encountered "evidence that providers of telecommunications for
Internet access . . . are violating these principles, [it would] not

hesitate to take action to address that conduct., 79 Indeed, the FCC
and others opposed to net neutrality legislation have referred to the
FCC's power to enforce these principles to support the argument
that net neutrality legislation is unnecessary.' s
On the other hand, the FCC expressly stated that in
adopting the Policy Statement, it was not adopting formal rules.8 "

77. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over

Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005) [hereinafter Policy
Statement] (policy statement).
78. Id. Further, the FCC subsequently asked merging companies to
agree to be bound by the principles articulated in the Policy Statement. See,
e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 18509 (2005) (memorandum
opinion and order) (noting in review of an application for merger between
Verizon Communications, Inc., and MCI, Inc., that both companies would
abide by the principles set forth in the Policy Statement).
79. Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 71, at 14904.
80. See, e.g., S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, DIGITAL DtJA Vu: OLD
IN
THE
NETWORK
NEUTRALITY
DEBATE
(2009),
http://freepress.net/files/dejavu.pdf (noting that opponents of net neutrality
legislation have argued that such legislation is unnecessary because the FCC
already has the power to enforce its Policy Statement).
81. Policy Statement, supra note 77, at 14988 n.15.
MYTHS
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The principles set forth in the Broadband Policy Statement were
rendered even fuzzier by the FCC's caveat that the rights of
Internet users articulated therein were "subject to reasonable
network management"8' 2 by broadband providers (without any
articulation of what types of deviations from the principles would
be excused as "reasonable network management"). As such, the
Policy Statement appears to embody a compromise among different
factions of the FCC regarding the legal force and effect of the rights
and principles it embodies. After the release of the Policy
Statement, it was unclear exactly how (if at all) the FCC would
enforce the rights articulated in the Policy Statement.
E. The FCC's First (and Incomplete) Steps Toward Broadband
Rulemaking
Two years after it adopted the Broadband Policy Statement,
the FCC took preliminary steps toward a formal rulemaking that
would set forth a regulatory framework applicable to providers of
broadband Internet access. In 2007, the FCC adopted a Broadband
Industry Practices Notice of Inquiry-typically the first step in a
rulemaking proceeding-designed to determine whether to
articulate broadly-applicable and enforceable net neutrality rules
governing network management practices, to elucidate the scope of
its authority to regulate broadband providers, and to develop a
factual record on which to determine whether such rules were
necessary.83 In particular, the FCC sought inquiry on the following
matters:
[W]e seek to enhance our understanding of the
nature of the market for broadband and related
services, whether network platform providers
and others favor or disfavor particular content,
how consumers are affected by these policies,
and whether consumer choice of broadband
providers is sufficient to ensure that all such
82. Id.

83. See Broadband Industry Practices, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894, 7896-98 (2007)
(notice of inquiry).
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policies ultimately benefit consumers. We ask
for specific examples of beneficial or harmful
behavior, and we ask whether any regulatory
intervention is necessary.
We seek a fuller understanding of the behavior
of broadband market participants today . . .
[D]o providers treat different packets in
different ways? How and why? Are these
providers operating consistent with the [FCC's
2005 Broadband] Policy Statement? . . . Do
providers deprioritize or block packets
containing material that is harmful to their
commercial interests, or prioritize packets
relating to applications or services in which
they have a commercial interest?
We next ask whether the Policy Statement
should be amended . . . [A]re there specific
changes to the Policy Statement that
commenters would recommend? We also ask
whether we should incorporate a new principle
of nondiscrimination. If so, how would
"nondiscrimination" be defined, and how
would such a principle read? Would it permit
any exclusive or preferential arrangements
among network platform or access providers
and content providers?
Finally, does the Commission have the legal
authority to enforce the Policy Statement in the
face of particular market failures or other
specific problems? . . . Assuming it is not
necessary to adopt rules at this time, what
market characteristics would justify the
adoption of rules?84
84. Id. at 7894-98.
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In asking for comments on this list of network neutrality
related questions, the FCC presumably indicated that it intended to
consider the broad range of responses in engaging in rulemaking on
net neutrality issues. Although the FCC received a substantial
number of comments in response to these questions, it never
progressed toward a rulemaking and never issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking. Instead, as discussed below, the FCC chose
to proceed via informal adjudication under its seemingly unfettered
ancillary jurisdiction in its August 2008 order regarding Comcast's
discriminatory network practices.85
F. ProposedNet Neutrality Legislation
Meanwhile, beginning in 2006, troubled by the potential
implications of the FCC's removal of common carriage obligations
from broadband providers, open access and net neutrality
advocates "prevailed upon members of Congress to introduce
network neutrality legislation. ''8 6 Such legislation would prohibit
broadband providers from discriminating against legal content or
applications in the form of blocking, prioritizing, or degrading such
content or applications. 87 The most speech-protective of the
proposed legislation would prohibit providers from blocking,
impairing, degrading, or discriminating against the ability of any
person to use a broadband connection to
access the content or
88
services available on broadband networks.
Other proposed net neutrality legislation, such as the
Communications Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement

85. See Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13034-36 (2008)
(memorandum opinion and order).
86. NUNZIATO, supra note 5, at 131.
87. See Network Neutrality Act of 2006, H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. § 4
(2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr5273ih/pdf/
BILLS-109hr5273ih.pdf.
88. See id. See also Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of
2006, H.R. 5417. 109th Cong. (2006), availableat http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/p
kg/BILLS-109hr5417RH/pdf/BILLS109hr5417RH.pdf (prohibiting broadband
Internet providers from interfering with users' ability to choose the lawful
content, services, and applications they wish to access).
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(COPE) Act of 2006,89 would not directly prohibit broadband

providers from discriminating against content or applications, but
would grant the FCC explicit authority to adjudicate consumer
complaints regarding discrimination and to enforce the principles
articulated in the 2005 Broadband Policy Statement. 90 Presumably,
the supporters of the COPE Act believed that the FCC does not
currently enjoy such authority and therefore must be granted such

authority in order to adjudicate net neutrality-related complaints.
None of the federal network neutrality bills was passed as of
September 2009. For the time being, it appears that net neutrality
advocates will enjoy greater success advancing their cause with the
FCC than with Congress, as I consider in Part II.
II.THE COMCAST ADJUDICATION AND THE FCC's
REGULATORY ABOUT-FACE

In the fall of 2007, Internet users began to suspect that
Comcast, the nation's second largest broadband provider, was
blocking and otherwise discriminating against legal file-sharing
applications. 9' With the help of the public interest organizations
Free Press and Public Knowledge, users were able to confirm their
89. H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006), availableat http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BILLS-109hr5252IH/pdf/BILLS-109hr52521H.pdf.
90. See id. In early 2008, Representatives Edward Markey and Charles
Pickering introduced the Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008, which
would, among other things: (1) establish that it is the United States's national
broadband policy "to maintain the freedom to use ... broadband.., networks
• . . without unreasonable interference from or discrimination by network

operators" and to safeguard against unreasonable discrimination and
degradation of content based on source, ownership, or destination; and (2)
require the FCC to assess broadband services and consumer rights via a series
of public broadband summits and report back to Congress on its findings.
Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008, H.R. 5353, 110th Cong. (2008),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr5353ih/pdf/BILLS110hr5353ih.pdf.
91. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation For Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications at 5,
Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (No. FCC 08-183) (memorandum
opinion and order), availableat http://www.freepress.net/files/fp-pk-comcast
_complaint.pdf.
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suspicions and establish that Comcast was blocking and degrading
the protocols employed by BitTorrent, an open source program
The question then
used for quickly distributing large files.92
became: was Comcast doing anything illegal? If so, what law was it
violating? As the provider of an "information service," Comcast
was subject neither to common carriage/nondiscrimination
obligations, nor to the FCC's regulatory oversight under Title II of
Although Comcast's actions
the Telecommunications Act. 93
arguably violated the Broadband Policy Statement, FCC Chairman
Martin had made clear that the principles articulated in the
Statement were not "rules" or otherwise "enforceable
documents., 9 4 Furthermore, it was not clear how one could frame a
complaint alleging a violation of the Broadband Policy Statement,
even assuming its principles were enforceable. While violations of
Title II common carriage obligations could be alleged via "Formal
Complaints,"9 5 the FCC had not established mechanisms for
bringing to its attention violations of the Broadband Policy
Statement.
Undaunted by these procedural uncertainties, in November
2007, Free Press and Public Knowledge asked the FCC to
undertake an investigation into Comcast's discriminatory network
management practices. They framed their allegations in the form
of a Formal Complaint and Petition for a Declaratory Ruling
(notwithstanding the fact that Formal Complaints were intended
for allegations of Title II violations), and alleged that Comcast was
degrading and blocking peer-to-peer file-sharing applications and
withholding information about these actions from Internet
subscribers. 96 They alleged that, beginning in August 2007, certain

92. See id. at 6-7.
93. See text accompanying note 17.
94. See Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on
Comm'n Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf.
95. See 47 U.S.C. § 208 (2006).
96. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation For Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications,
supra note 91, at 5-11; Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that
Degrading an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy
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Comcast Internet subscribers who sought to use peer-to-peer filesharing applications such as BitTorrent noticed that their file
transfers were being cut off or severely degraded by Comcast.97
When these users complained, Comcast flatly denied that it was
blocking, degrading, or otherwise "shaping" any traffic on its
network and blamed the problems that users were experiencing on
the users themselves and on the BitTorrent protocol.9 8 In October
2007, however, the Associated Press (AP), together with the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), produced clear evidence
that Comcast had indeed degraded and blocked a variety of peerto-peer applications, including those using BitTorrent, Gnutella,
FTP, and even Lotus Notes's software suite (which is routinely used
by businesses to share e-mail, calendars, and other files).9 9 In
particular, AP reported problems in using BitTorrent to download
copies of the King James Bible from a computer with a Comcast
cable modem. °
EFF, upon further investigation, found that
Comcast was employing network management tools to cause peerto-peer connections to shut down 1 and intentionally configuring its
network to jam such traffic and to make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for its subscribers to use such applications. 102

Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Reasonable Network

Management" at 7-14; Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (No. FCC 08183) (memorandum opinion and order), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
broadband networkmanagement/fpet al nn declaratory-ruling.pdf.
97. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation For Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications,
supra note 91, at 5.
98. Posting of Seth Schoen to Deeplinks Blog, http://www.eff.org/deep
links/2007/09/comcast-and-bittorrent (Sept. 13, 2007).
99. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation For Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications,
supra note 91, at 6-7.
100. See id. at 9.
101. PETER ECKERSLEY ET AL., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
PACKET FORGERY BY ISPs: A REPORT ON THE COMCAST AFFAIR 1-2 (2007),

http://www.eff.org/files/ effcomcast-report.pdf.
102. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation For Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications,
supra note 91, at 9.
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Furthermore, Comcast's method of jamming such
applications was designed to hide from users the fact that it was
Comcast itself that was taking actions to discriminate against such
applications.0 3 When a Comcast user attempted to send packets to
others using certain file-sharing applications, Comcast shut down
the connection between that user and other non-Comcast users by
"hacking into its own network and using a clandestine 'man in the
middle' tactic whereby each party is sent a communication 'RST'
(reset) message which falsely tells the other party to shut down the
connection."' 4 As a result of such interference, each affected user's
computer received a message invisible to the user that looked like it
came from another, peer computer, instructing it to stop
communicating. "But neither message originated from the other
computer-it comes from Comcast."'' 5
As one commentator
characterized Comcast's interference, "[i]f it were a telephone
conversation, it would be like the operator breaking into the
conversation, telling each talker in the voice of the other: 'Sorry, I
have to hang up. Good bye."' 1 6
Free Press and Public Knowledge claimed that Comcast's
action violated the principles articulated in the Broadband Policy
Statement, especially Internet users' freedom "to access the lawful
Internet content of their choice" and to "run applications and use
services of their choice."'0 7 Comcast eventually acknowledged that
it purposely slowed down some traffic on its network, including
some music and movie downloads, but claimed that it should be
permitted to do so in order to direct traffic to prevent network
clogs. 0 8 It argued that its actions fell within the "reasonable

103. Id.
104. Vuze, Inc., Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network
Management Practices by Broadband Network Operators at 10, WC Docket
No. 07-52 (Nov. 14, 2007) (petition for rulemaking), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/vuze-petition-20071114.pdf.
105. Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic,
MSNBC.coM, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597/.
106. Id.
107. Policy Statement, supra note 77, at 14988.
108. See Grant Gross, EFF: Comcast Continues to Block P-to-P, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
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network management" exception to the freedoms guaranteed to
users under the Policy Statement,' ° which, Comcast argued, the
Commission recognized was necessary "for the good of all
customers.""°
A. The FCC's Order
In its August 1, 2008, informal adjudication on this matter,
the FCC sided with the Internet users."1 The FCC first concluded
that it indeed enjoyed jurisdiction to rule on this matter. 2 After
establishing its authority to adjudicate, the FCC found that
Comcast's actions violated the Broadband Policy Statement and did
not fall within the Statement's exception for "reasonable network
management. '' 1 3
It concluded that Comcast's network
management practices were discriminatory and not reasonably
tailored to address Comcast's concerns about network
congestion. 14
It found further that Comcast had an anticompetitive motive to engage in such discrimination, as the filesharing applications against which it discriminated posed a
competitive threat to Comcast's own video-on-demand service."'
The FCC also found that Comcast's disclosures to its subscribers
regarding its discriminatory actions were wholly inadequate and
that subscribers could not possibly have learned from Comcast's
disclosures that such discrimination was occurring."' I analyze each
of these conclusions below.

2007/11/30/AR2007113001543.html.
109. See Policy Statement, supra note 77, at 14988 n.15.
110. Ryan Paul, FCC to Investigate Comcast BitTorrent Blocking, ARS

Jan. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080108-fcc-toinvestigate-comcast-bittorrent-blocking.html
(quoting Comcast Executive
Vice President David L. Cohen).
TECHNICA,

111. Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 (2008) (memorandum

opinion and order).
112. Id. at 13034-44.
113. Id. at 13058.
114. Id. at 13054-56.
115. Id. at 13030.
116. Id. at 13059.
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As a threshold matter, the FCC declared that it enjoyed the
broad, general authority to enforce "federal Internet policy," which
encompassed the power to adjudicate the present dispute between
Free Press and Comcast. 117 It grounded its authority to adjudicate
in the broad outlines of federal Internet policy articulated by
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in particular, the
general policy of "encourag[ing] the development of technologies
[that] maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals . . . who use the Internet."... 8 Second, the FCC
explained that when it promulgated its Broadband Policy Statement
in 2005, it clearly asserted its responsibility for enforcing this
federal Internet policy. 119 In elaborating upon this policy, the
Broadband Policy Statement made clear that the FCC intended to
"preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the
public Internet,"120 and to "preserve and promote the vibrant and
open character of the Internet as the telecommunications
marketplace enters the broadband age.' ' 121 In furtherance of those
goals, the FCC expressly instructed broadband providers that they
would be required to ensure that their users enjoyed the freedom to
''run applications and use services of their choice" and to "access
the lawful Internet content of their choice."' 122 Furthermore, when
it adopted the Broadband Policy Statement, the FCC warned that if
it
was presented
with
"evidence
that providers
of
telecommunications for Internet access . . . [were] violating these
principles, [it would] not hesitate to take action to address that
23
conduct."
The FCC further defended its jurisdiction to adjudicate this
dispute by referring back to the Brand X decision itself, in which
the Supreme Court dismissed criticisms of the FCC's decision to
exempt broadband providers from common carriage regulations by

117. Id. at 13045.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R at 13034.
Policy Statement, supra note 77, at 14988.
Id.
Id.
Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 71, at 14904.
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explaining that the FCC would retain the power to impose
regulatory obligations on broadband providers "under its Title I
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign
communications."' 1 4 Under such Title I authority, the FCC
explained, it enjoyed broad authority and jurisdiction over
"communication by wire," including over Comcast's provision of
broadband Internet access. 12 In response to the argument that the
FCC's ancillary jurisdiction must be reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of something in particular, the FCC
explained that that "something" is the federal Internet policy set
forth in the Telecommunications Act. 126 The FCC then articulated
a host of other provisions of the
Communications Act to which its
127
ancillary.
also
was
jurisdiction
Turning to the means it selected to define the contours of
national Internet policy in general and net neutrality norms in
particular-via informal adjudication instead of via rulemakingthe FCC acknowledged the Supreme Court's mandate 128 that it
"fill[] in the interstices of the [Telecommunications Act,] . . . as
much as possible, through th[e] quasi-legislative promulgation of
rules," rather than by case-by-case adjudication. 12 It defended its
decision to proceed via adjudication in this case by adverting to the
novel, complex, and variegated nature of Internet traffic
management issues, which rendered case-by-case adjudication
preferable to one-size-fits-all rules. 130 Moreover, in furtherance of
the national Internet policy set forth in the Telecommunications
Act that "broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory
environment,''. the FCC claimed that proceeding via case-by-case

124. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 976 (2005).
125. Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13035 (2008) (memorandum

opinion and order).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 13036-40.
128. Id. at 13045.
129. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (emphasis added).
130. Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13046.

131. Id. at 13046 (quoting High-Speed Access, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4798, 4802
(2002) (declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking)).
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adjudication established a comparatively less burdensome
regulatory environment for broadband providers. 132
In addressing the merits of Free Press's complaint, the FCC
found that Comcast's network management practices unlawfully
discriminated among applications and protocols by using deep
packet inspection technology to peer into Internet users'
communications and terminate communications based on their
content. 133 The FCC found that Comcast terminated certain
connections when it determined that there were too many peer-topeer uploads by sending RST (reset) packets to interrupt and
terminate these communications. 34 It held that Comcast's use of
deep packet inspection technology and Reset Injection was
unreasonable, constituted discriminatory censorship in violation of
the principles articulated in the Broadband Policy Statement, and
was not "carefully tailored to [Comcast's] interest in easing network
congestion. '
In particular, Comcast's network practices were
overinclusive-not targeting all Internet users who used substantial
bandwidth, but only those who used disfavored applications,
regardless of the level of overall network congestion at the time or
whether the user's particular geographic area had congested
nodes. 116 Comcast's network practices were also underinclusive, in
that even an Internet user using an extraordinary amount of
bandwidth would be left alone by Comcast as long as he or she was
not using a disfavored application like BitTorrent.'37 Applying a
form of strict scrutiny to Comcast's network management practices,
the FCC went on to find that Comcast had alternative avenues to
advance its legitimate network management goals that were less
restrictive of expression, including capping individual users'
bandwidth consumption or charging overage fees to high capacity

132. Id.

133. Id. at 13050-51.
134. Id. at 13051.

135. Id. at 13056.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 13056-57.
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users, instead of punishing anyone who uses disfavored peer-topeer technology.' 38
Finally, the FCC sharply rebuked Comcast for failing to
disclose its network management practices to affected Internet
users or to the FCC itself. 3 9 To remedy this lack of meaningful
disclosure, the FCC ordered Comcast to:
(1) disclose to the Commission the precise
contours of the network management practices
[it was employing] ...; (2) submit a compliance
plan . . . that describes how it intends to
transition
from
discriminatory
to
nondiscriminatory
network
management
practices by the end of [2008]; and (3) disclose
to the Commission and the public the details of
the network management practices that it
intends to deploy following the termination of
its current practices, including the thresholds
that will trigger0 any limits on customers' access
4
to bandwidth.
The FCC, however, declined to adopt generally applicable
disclosure requirements-or any other requirements-regarding
network management practices for broadband providers
generally,14 ' limiting itself to imposing these mandates on Comcast
in particular. The FCC concluded by retaining continuing
jurisdiction over this matter and by urging Free Press and members
of the public generally 2 to "keep a watchful eye on Comcast as it
14
carries out this relief."'
B. ChairmanKevin J. Martin's ConcurringStatement
While concurring generally with the FCC's order, FCC
Chairman Martin was more willing to articulate broadly-applicable

138. Id. at 13057.
139. Id. at 13058-59.
140. Id. at 13060.

141. Id. at 13046, 13058.
142. Id. at 13061.
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rules for broadband providers and set forth these rules in a way
similar to that applicable under First Amendment scrutiny. He
explained that the FCC was "ready, willing, and able" to enforce
the net neutrality principles articulated in its Broadband Policy
Statement, 143 and would conduct its analysis of whether a
broadband provider violated these principles as follows: first, the
FCC would consider "whether the network management practice
[was] intended to distinguish between legal and illegal activity,"
such as child pornography or copyright-infringing content. 144 Next,
it would consider whether the broadband service provider had
"adequately disclosed its network management practices," both
because Internet users should be able to rely upon such disclosure
so they can make informed decisions about their choice of
broadband provider and because lack of full disclosure is strong
evidence that the practice is unreasonable. 145 Finally, if the FCC
were to determine that the broadband provider arbitrarily degraded
or blocked legal content under the guise of "network
management," it would apply a version of intermediate scrutiny to
determine whether the network management practice "further[ed]
an important interest and [was] carefully tailored to serve that
146
interest."
Applying this analysis, Commissioner Martin had no
difficulty concluding that Comcast's discriminatory blocking of
BitTorrent and similar applications was unreasonable and unlawful.
As he explained,
If we aren't going to stop a company that is
looking inside its subscribers' communications
(reading the "packets" they send), blocking
that communication when it uses a particular
application regardless of whether there is
congestion on the network, hiding what it is
doing by making consumers think the problem
is their own, and lying about it to the public,
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 13065 (Martin, Chairman, concurring).
Id. at 13066.
Id.
Id.
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what would we stop? Failure to act here would
have reasonably led to the conclusion that new
legislation and rules are necessary.141
Because the Commission was "ready, willing and able" to
regulate such bad practices by broadband providers on an informal,
ad hoc basis, neither formal rulemaking nor broadly applicable
net
148
Martin.
to
according
necessary,
was
legislation
neutrality
C. Commissioner Robert M. McDowell's Dissent

Commissioner McDowell disagreed with the majority of
FCC Commissioners regarding the FCC's jurisdiction to adjudicate
in these circumstances. He explained that, "[s]ince the Supreme
Court's decision in Brand X, we have been busy taking broadband
services out of the common carriage realm of Title II and classifying
149
them as largely unregulated Title I information services."
Accordingly, with respect to Comcast, he concluded, "we do not
have any rules governing Internet network management to
enforce."' 5 ° He emphasized that the Broadband Policy Statement
principles were not intended to serve as enforceable rules, and that
the FCC had clearly contemplated a rulemaking proceeding
regarding network management practices, as was evidenced by its
adoption of the Broadband Industry Practices Notice of Inquiry in

2007, the first step in a rulemaking proceeding.' 5' As McDowell
complained, "no notice of proposed rulemaking, with a chance for
public comment, was ever issued. Nothing regulating Internet
network governance has been codified in the Code
of Federal
15 2
Regulations. In short, we have no rules to enforce.,
McDowell also sharply criticized the majority's broad
conception of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction, under which "the
Commission apparently can do anything so long as it frames its

147. Id. at 13067.
148. See id.

149. Id. at 13089 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting).
150. Id.

151. Id. at 13089-90.
152. Id.at 13090.
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actions in terms of promoting the Internet or broadband
deployment."' 5 3 He also observed that members of Congress
apparently believed that the FCC did not enjoy the jurisdiction to
regulate broadband providers' network management practices and
accordingly sought (unsuccessfully, so far) to enact net neutrality
legislation that would grant the FCC such jurisdiction. 154
In summary, the FCC Commissioners were sharply divided
in their understanding of whether the FCC had the power to
adjudicate in the Comcast incident, whether the FCC had rules to
enforce against Comcast, how the FCC (and Congress) should
proceed in the future in protecting Internet users' freedom to
communicate, and what level of scrutiny it should apply to
allegations of discrimination by broadband providers.
D. Process-BasedCriticismsof the FCC'sApproach
The FCC's approach to regulation of broadband providers
in its Comcast order is insufficient to protect Internet users' free
speech rights and is vulnerable to attack on several fronts. First, as
a procedural matter, there are strong arguments that an agency
cannot enforce a policy statement (especially one that it itself
declared unenforceable) 5 5 that did not emerge from a notice-andcomment rulemaking.1 56 As discussed above, FCC Chairman
Martin made clear when adopting the Broadband Policy Statement
that "policy statements do not establish rules nor are they
enforceable documents." '57 Courts have held that agencies "cannot
apply or rely upon [such nonbinding policy statements] as law
because a general statement of policy only announces what the
agency seeks to establish as policy." 58 Although agencies enjoy the
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying note 94.

156. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 4 (manuscript at 32) ("[A]n agency
cannot enforce a policy statement that did not emerge from notice-andcomment rulemaking or explicitly warn parties that it would be enforced.").
157. Press Release, Chairman Kevin J. Martin, supra note 94.
158. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). See also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory
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discretion to act via adjudication instead of via rulemaking, such
adjudications must enforce previously articulated rules or binding
principles. In its Comcast adjudication, the FCC did neither.
Second, the FCC's adjudication is subject to criticism on the
grounds that it relied entirely on a paper record composed of
predominantly self-serving statements by the parties themselves or
other interested parties that were not subject to penalties of perjury
or cross-examination. As Commissioner McDowell complained in
his dissent,
[a]ll we have to rely on are the apparently
unsigned declarations of three individuals
representing the complainant's view, some
press reports, and the conflicting declaration of
a Comcast employee. The rest of the record
consists purely of differing opinions and
conjecture . . . . [The Commission should
instead have] conduct[ed] its own factual
investigation under its enforcement powers.159
The agency's informal adjudication in Comcast differs
markedly from the formal adjudication mode that is available to the
FCC, in which adjudications are held before one of the FCC's two
full-time administrative law judges, employ a trial and investigative
staff that is separate from the FCC, and have a variety of
procedural requirements. 16 The processes attendant to formal
adjudications alleviate many of the concerns inherent in informal
adjudications. As Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai explain,
the trial-type context of formal adjudications,
with the parties presenting evidence and
rebutting their opponents' evidence and with
the hearing officer's decision based solely on
the material presented at the hearing, alleviates

Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
407 (2007) (arguing that agencies "cannot base an enforcement action solely
on a regulated entity's noncompliance with a guidance document.").
159. Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13092 (McDowell, Comm'r, dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
160. See Weiser, supra note 4 (manuscript at 51-52 & nn.177-79).
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the fear of powerful interests presenting
arguments privately to the decisionmaker and
more generally reduces concerns about bias
affecting the agency's decision. 1 '
Because the FCC failed to employ formal adjudication and
instead employed a mode of informal adjudication in which it
purported to enforce principles and policies it had previously
labeled "non-enforceable," its process is flawed in many respects.
Although the decision reached by the FCC reprimanding
Comcast appears to be an important step in the right direction,
across-the-board regulation of broadband providers in the form of
either legislation or agency rulemaking-both of which were
opposed by a majority of the FCC Commissioners 162-is necessary
to ensure that discrimination against content does not occur in the
first place. While post hoe reprimands specifically directed toward
one particular company are an important indication of the FCC's
current approach toward net discrimination, they do not obviate the
need for broadly applicable, ex ante regulation.
III.Too LITTLE, Too LATE: THE FCC's ADJUDICATION
ACTIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT INTERNET
USERS' FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The Case For Net Neutrality Regulation
Instead of engaging in ad hoc, informal adjudication as an
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC should have concluded
back in 2002 that broadband providers were common carriers that
were subject at least to nondiscrimination obligations under Title II

161. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA?
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269,
313 (2007).
162. FCC Chairman Martin, for example, made clear in his concurrence
with the Comcast Order that he has "consistently opposed calls for legislation
or rules to impose network neutrality."
Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13067

(Martin, Chairman, concurring).
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of the Communications Act. Congress has the power, in effect, to
undo the FCC's decision to exempt broadband providers from
common carriage obligations and to subject broadband providers to
the nondiscrimination requirements imposed upon common
carriers under Title 11.163 As I argue in greater detail in Virtual
Freedom: Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the Internet Age, 64 in
the absence of common carriage obligations imposed on broadband
providers, carefully crafted net neutrality legislation is necessary to
protect our free speech interests in the Internet age. Congress
enjoys the power to regulate-or to require the FCC to regulatebroadband providers so as to subject them to the obligation not to
discriminate against the content members of the public seek to
communicate. 165 Such regulation would advance the free speech
interests of members of the public and would not infringe the First
Amendment rights of broadband providers.
Even assuming that broadband providers enjoy a
protectable First Amendment interest in the functions they
perform, net neutrality regulations prohibiting broadband providers
from engaging in discrimination against legal content or
applications would be deemed content-neutral regulations of
speech that survive the applicable intermediate scrutiny. Courts'
analyses of the constitutionality of such regulation would be similar
to the analysis the FCC itself imposed in its Comcast
adjudication. 166 Such regulation would advance the substantial
government interest of protecting the public's access to information
and, if the regulation were carefully crafted and appropriately
tailored to advance this interest, it would withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. 117 Consistent with the Supreme Court's

163. Such obligations could be imposed by net neutrality legislation. See
supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
164. NUNZIATO, supra note 5.
165. Such requirements could be imposed by net neutrality legislation.
See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 133-38.
167. See Letter from Tim Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of
Law, and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to FCC
(Aug. 22, 2003), availableat http://www.freepress.net/files/wulessig-fcc.pdf.
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analysis in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,161 in which the
Court recognized the limited First Amendment editorial rights of
the cable companies while upholding regulations requiring them to
169
serve as conduits for content that was not of their choosing,
carefully crafted regulation of broadband providers prohibiting
them from discriminating unreasonably against legal content or
applications comports with the First Amendment's protections.
Thus, even if broadband providers were able to convince a court
that their First Amendment interests were implicated by net
neutrality regulation, Turner would counsel in favor of holding that
such interests were outweighed by the countervailing public interest
in "'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources"'17 and in "public discussion and informed
deliberation [that] . .. democratic government
presupposes and the
' 171
First Amendment seeks to achieve."
Any regulation prohibiting broadband providers from
blocking legal content or applications should also mandate
transparencyin any such blocking-much like the FCC mandated in
broadband providers to
its Comcast adjudication 12-requiring
inform their subscribers when content or applications are blocked
and the reasons for such blocking (e.g., the provider claims that the
content that was blocked constituted illegal child pornography or
copyright-infringing works). Mandating transparency in blocking
will enable users to impose meaningful checks on the blocking
decisions of broadband providers and ensure that such blocking
does not mask the provider's unlawful discrimination.
It is
currently quite difficult, if not impossible, for users to discern
whether content or applications have been blocked (as was evident
in the case of Comcast's discriminatory actions). Indeed, lack of
168. 520 U.S. 180 (1997). See NUNZIATO, supra note 5, at ch. 7
(discussing Turner and its implications for the judicial scrutiny of net
neutrality legislation).
169. Turner, 520 U.S. at 224.
170. Id. at 192 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
663 (1994)).
171. Id. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Whitney v. California,274
U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
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transparency will only compound the discrimination because
users-or, as in Comcast's case, the broadband provider13-may
attribute the difficulties in access to the blocked content or
applications themselves, instead of placing the blame where it
belongs-with their broadband provider. Internet users enjoy the
right to be informed that content or applications have been blocked
by their providers and the reasons for such blocking so they can
impose meaningful checks on broadband providers' discriminatory
actions.
Network operators should be permitted to prioritize types
of traffic that inherently require high bandwidth without
discriminating within and among those types of applications.
Operators should be permitted to engage in uniform applicationbased prioritizing, in which all applications of a certain type are
accorded the same priority of delivery. 7 4 Under such regulation,
broadband providers should not be prohibited from according
higher priority to all Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) packets,
for example, because such packets are latency-sensitive.'7 5
However, broadband providers should be prohibited from
prioritizing within such types of applications so as to favor their
affiliated VoIP applications over those of a rival, as providers have
been accused of doing in discriminating against VoIP provider
Vonage while prioritizing and favoring their own VolP
applications, for example. 176
To protect the free flow of
173. See supra text accompanying note 98.
174. See
FTC,
STAFF
REPORT:
BROADBAND
CONNECTIVITY
COMPETITION POLICY 88-89 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/

broadband/v070000report.pdf.
175. By employing packet marking, "'preferential treatment can be given
to latency-sensitive applications during periods of increased network
congestion,' and '[p]acket marking based on application classification . . .
enables routers upstream or downstream . . . to prioritize traffic based on

individual application requirements and address congestion at relevant
network points."' Id. at 89 (quoting CIsco SYSS., CISCO SERVICE CONTROL: A
GUIDE TO SUSTAINED BROADBAND PROFITABILITY

4-5 (2005), available at

http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/CiscoBroadbandProfit.pdf).
176. See NUNZIATO, supra note 5, at 9 (discussing the Madison River
Communications incident, in which a DSL provider blocked access to
Vonage).
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information and the public's access to information from a wide
variety of sources, such discriminatory prioritization should be
prohibited.
In summary, Congress should pass legislation prohibiting
(or requiring the FCC to prohibit) broadband providers from
blocking legal content or applications across the board and from
engaging in discriminatory prioritization or degradation of such
content or applications. Such legislation should also mandate
transparency in blocking or degrading, requiring broadband
providers to inform Internet users of any content or applications
that were blocked or degraded and the reasons therefore, so that
users will be able to impose meaningful checks on these decisions of
broadband providers and ensure that such actions do not mask
unlawful discrimination.
CONCLUSION

Since the FCC embarked upon the path of removing common
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations from broadband providers
in 2002, the rights of Internet users to communicate on the Internet
have been imperiled. The stop-gap attempts undertaken by the
FCC to remedy the problems caused by its decision to undertake
this deregulatory course of action have been insufficient to protect
Internet users' free speech interests.
The Broadband Policy
Statement promulgated by the FCC in 2005 does not impose
meaningful obligations on broadband providers. Although the
Supreme Court sought to assure Internet users that the FCC would
protect their right to communicate in the broadband realm by
exercising its ancillary jurisdiction, the exercise of such jurisdiction
is fraught with procedural and other difficulties, as evidenced by the
FCC's recent informal adjudication in the Comcast case. Because
the FCC has declined to articulate generally applicable
nondiscrimination rules for broadband providers, the rights of
Internet users to communicate in the broadband realm are
insufficiently protected.
Broadly applicable regulation or
legislation is necessary to guarantee our right to communicate in
the Internet age.

